Abstract: This paper reports the results of two randomized field experiments, each o ering di erent populations of Chicago youth a supported summer job. The program consistently reduces violent-crime arrests, even after the summer, without improving employment, schooling, or other arrests; if anything, property crime increases over 2-3 years.
Introduction
For at least half a century, social scientists and policymakers have argued that a combination of job training, search assistance, remedial coursework, and subsidized work can improve employment and wages by developing human capital and reducing search costs (LaLonde, 2003) . Improving employment may in turn increase the opportunity cost of crime or improve other social outcomes, though non-employment outcomes are often treated as ancillary benefits of improved employment in the literature (Crépon and van den Berg, 2016 ). Reviews of the evidence on whether employment programs cost-e ectively achieve these goals in the U.S. -at least among the disadvantaged youth who are the focus of this paper -lean fairly negative, though vary in their level of pessimism. Most conclude that only very intensive and expensive training programs improve labor market outcomes, while only a tiny handful reduce crime, largely limited to the period of the program itself. 1 1 See Appendix A for a summary of these reviews and the youth job training literature. serve, it has been impossible to separate program from population di erences until now.
We use two randomized controlled trials (RCTs) of a Chicago summer jobs program, along with a new machine learning technique for estimating treatment heterogeneity, to test these ideas. The first RCT in 2012 o ered an 8-week, part-time summer job at minimum wage ($8.25/hour) and an adult job mentor to a population of disadvantaged high-school students. 3 The second RCT in 2013 o ered a similar 6-week program, but purposefully expanded the eligibility criteria to include disconnected, out-of-school youth more like those targeted by other youth employment interventions. Most youth also participated in a curriculum built on cognitive behavioral therapy principles aimed at helping them manage their cognitive and emotional responses to conflict, as well as encouraging them to set and achieve personal goals. We track youth in administrative data through 2015 from the Chicago Public Schools, the Illinois State Police, and the Illinois Department of Employment Security.
In both study years, a supported summer job generates dramatic and robust reductions in violent-crime arrests in the year after random assignment: the local average treatment e ect is a 42 percent decline in the first study and a 33 percent decline in the second (4.1 and 7.9 fewer arrests per 100 participants, respectively). Across the whole sample, the e ect is still significant after adjustments for multiple hypothesis testing. The pooled sample shows a 26 percent decline in violent-crime arrests even after removing the program months from the data (p =.067), meaning the behavior change is not simply a mechanical result of keeping 3 Crime results from within Chicago over the first 16 months and one-year schooling outcomes for this RCT were reported in Heller (2014) . This paper adds two more years of school data, two more years of crime data that now include all arrests state-wide, and previously unreported employment outcomes, as well as the entire second study in 2013. youth busy over the summer that disappears as soon as the job ends. The program also does not seem to increase the overall opportunity cost of crime or keep youth out of trouble more generally: Participants' total number of arrests does not change, and if anything, property crime increases in later years. Neither employment outcomes nor other indicators of human capital such as schooling improve, at least on average.
We then estimate treatment heterogeneity based on observable characteristics. Tests for heterogeneity typically involve interacting a treatment indicator with a series of baseline covariates, one at a time. But each additional hypothesis test raises the probability of spurious findings. And if heterogeneity is driven by the interaction of more than one characteristic at a time (or a non-linear function of a continuous variable), typical interaction tests may miss substantively important variation in treatment e ects. To more flexibly estimate treatment heterogeneity, we use a causal forest (Athey and Imbens, 2016; Wager and Athey, 2018) , predicting treatment e ects based on high-dimensional, non-linear functions of observables and mining the data for responsive subgroups in a principled way. We develop tests for whether the predicted heterogeneity "works" in detecting actual heterogeneity, describe who benefits, and use the patterns of heterogeneity to assess potential mechanisms.
The causal forest identifies significant heterogeneity in employment impacts, which standard interaction-based approaches would miss. We identify a subgroup whose post-program employment improves by 15 percentage points (44 percent), which on its own is an important result for policy. That subgroup is younger, more engaged in school, more Hispanic, more female, and less likely to have an arrest record. In other words, the employment benefiters are not the disconnected youth whom other employment programs typically target. Although 5 00850 9
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the results are imprecise, we also show that the drop in violence is not concentrated among the employment benefiters. If anything, non-violent crime increases among those with better employment. These findings o er little support for the traditional theory that improved human capital and increased opportunity cost explain crime declines. They do, however, emphasize the potential gains from more flexible approaches to treatment heterogeneity;
we calculate that targeting the program using the causal forest could generate employment impacts 4 times larger than targeting using a more standard approach.
We find no significant heterogeneity in e ects on violent-crime arrests or school persistence. The fact that we cannot distinguish variation in violence impacts, at least within our disadvantaged urban population, suggests the value of targeting SYEPs towards youth who are at risk of violent crime -a group who traditional training programs often screen out. 4 The question of why violence declines for everyone, seemingly independent from changes in employment, is important. Expanded pro-social attitudes, improved beliefs about the future, or general "staying busy" explanations are not entirely satisfactory given that property crime increases in later follow-up years, and that bigger employment gains seem to accompany increases in non-violent crime. But more nuanced crime theory highlights the role of opportunity: A program that introduces youth to richer areas and new peers may increase opportunities for theft and drug purchases but decrease opportunities to fight, even without changing labor market outcomes (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Cook, 1986; Clarke, 1995) .
Anecdotal evidence from employers provides another hypothesis for why violence, which by definition involves conflict with other people, may change: Employers report helping Chicago public high schools. A total of 1,634 youth (about 13 percent of the prior year's student population in these schools) applied for the 700 available program slots. The research team randomly assigned treatment slots at the individual level within school and gender blocks. Youth worked at a range of non-profit and government employers on tasks such as supervising younger youth at summer camps, clearing lots to plant a community garden, improving infrastructure at local schools, and providing administrative support at aldermen's o ces. Because of restrictions imposed by a funder, there were no private sector jobs.
In the second year of the program, 16-to 22-year-old male youth in one of two applicant pools could apply. The first pool (n = 2,127) was invited to voluntarily apply directly from the criminal justice system (from probation o ces, juvenile detention or prison, or a center to serve justice-involved youth). The rest (n = 3,089) had applied to Chicago's broader summer programming; those who were ages 16-20, lived in one of the 30 highest-violence community areas, and included a social security number (SSN) on their application entered the lottery. Notably, participants were no longer required to be in school. The resulting 5,216 boys were individually randomly assigned to treatment or control groups within applicant pool-age-geography blocks (2,634 treatment and 2,582 control), with each block assigned to a specific service agency. Because of the time-constrained recruiting process, the number of youth assigned to the treatment group far exceeds the number of available slots (1,000). 6
One important implication is that the maximum possible take-up rate -even if the first 6 In serving a very mobile and arrest-prone population, it was clear that filling all the available slots would take considerable time. To speed up recruiting, we gave providers lists of hundreds more youth than available program slots upfront. We count everyone on the list as treatment, since we could not enforce the rule that providers work down the list in order. In 2013, DFSS also encouraged treatment youth to keep participating in programming o ered by the community service agencies after the summer ended, including a mix of additional social-emotional learning activities, job mentoring, and social outings such as sporting events and DJ classes. These activities were much lower intensity than the summer programming, and participants received a small stipend (~$200) rather than an hourly wage.
Appendix B reports additional details about the program, randomization, and recruitment.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We match study youth to existing administrative datasets from a variety of government sources. Program application and participation records come from DFSS. We measure crime with Illinois State Police (ISP) arrest records, which combine police records from departments across the state. 7 We use the description of each o ense to categorize o enses as violent, property, drug, or other (vandalism, trespassing, outstanding warrants, etc.) . The data cover both juvenile and adult arrests from 2001 through two (2013 cohort) or three (2012 cohort) years post-random assignment. Youth who have never been arrested will not be in the ISP records, so we assign zero arrests for individuals not matched to the data.
We use student-level administrative records from Chicago Public Schools (CPS) to capture schooling outcomes. These data include enrollment status, grade level, course grades, 7 The prior study on the first cohort (Heller, 2014) used Chicago Police Department data rather than statewide data. That study only included arrests within Chicago and covered a somewhat di erent time period, so the amount of crime reported here is slightly di erent. Our main analysis excludes pre-program graduates (n = 1,422) as well as anyone who never appeared in the CPS records (and so likely always attended school outside of the district, n = 435). 9 Since these are both baseline characteristics, the exclusion should not undermine the integrity of random assignment (see Appendix Table A1 for balance tests on this sub-sample). We focus on the school year following the program, since missing GPA and attendance data become a bigger problem over time as more students graduate, drop out, or transfer. To assess longer term performance, we define a school persistence measure that is available for everyone in the CPS data regardless of missing attendance and GPA data in future years: an indicator that equals 1 if the youth has graduated from CPS in the first two post-program school years or is still attending school in the third post-program school year.
We measure employment using quarterly Unemployment Insurance (UI) records, which include earnings and employer for each formal sector UI-covered job. We obtain SSNs for matching to UI data through school records, although the school district did not require students to report SSNs. As such, our main employment analysis excludes youth who could not be matched due to missing SSNs (26 percent of the sample either never enrolled in CPS or were missing SSN in the school records). This approach assumes that SSNs are missing completely at random; Appendix 
Analytical Methods
To make results easier to compare across two study cohorts with di erent take-up rates, we focus on local average treatment e ects (LATEs), or the e ect of participating on compliers (Angrist et al., 1996) . With almost no control crossover in our setting, these estimates should be quite close to the treatment-on-the-treated. Intent-to-treat (ITT) results are in Appendix D. We estimate LATEs using random assignment as an instrument for any program participation, including block fixed e ects and the controls discussed in Appendix E (which also shows that results are similar without covariates). To help judge the magnitude of the LATEs, we estimate average outcomes for the control youth who would have participated had they been assigned to treatment -the "control complier mean" (CCM) (see Heller et al. 2017 , Katz et al. 2001 . 10 We report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on individual when using the pooled sample to account for the 140 youth in both study
cohorts. Appendix Table A4 shows similar p-values from randomization inference (permuting treatment assignment 10,000 times to approximate Fisher's exact test). This tests the sharp null of no treatment e ects for anyone and avoids relying on modeling assumptions and large-sample approximations that may not hold in finite samples (Athey and Imbens, 2017) .
In any experiment testing program e ects on multiple outcomes, not to mention heterogeneous treatment e ects by subgroup, one might worry that the probability of Type I error increases with the number of tests conducted. We take a number of steps to ensure 10 The 2012 study had two treatment arms that di ered by the provision of a socialemotional learning curriculum. Because the di erences between treatment arms are generally not statistically significant, we focus the main text on the overall treatment-control contrast;
results by treatment arm are in Appendix F.
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Second, we present two inference adjustments to account for multiple hypothesis testing.
The first uses a free step-down resampling method to control the family-wise error rate (FWER), the probability that at least one of the true null hypotheses in a family of hypothesis tests is rejected (Anderson, 2008; Westfall and Young, 1993) . The second shows the q-value, or the smallest level at which we can control the false-discovery rate (FDR) in a group of hypotheses and still reject the null for that outcome (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) . This adjustment increases the power of individual tests in exchange for allowing some specified proportion of rejections to be false. We define our families as: 1) the four types of crime separately for each follow-up year (excluding total arrests since it is a linear combination of the rest), 2) the four main schooling outcomes for youth with a CPS record who had not yet graduated prior to the program (enrollment, days present, GPA, and school persistence),
3) total earnings and overall, provider, and non-provider employment in program quarters, and 4) total earnings and overall, provider, and non-provider employment in post-program quarters. Appendix G provides implementation details.
Third, we eschew the standard approach to treatment heterogeneity: choosing several one-way interactions a priori to test for heterogeneity (or worse, searching over a large number of interaction e ects for particularly responsive subgroups, which risks over-fitting and detecting spurious e ects). Instead, we implement a version of Wager and Athey's (2018) causal forest algorithm, which predicts treatment e ects based on an individual's covariates. race (e.g., only African-American males with more than 3 prior arrests who live in neighborhoods with less than 12 percent unemployment rates benefit from the program), then researcher-specified interactions will miss it. But in theory, the causal forest can capture 11 It is not clear that the causal forest works directly with an IV involving non-compliance.
Take-up rates within leaves may be 0 or close to 0 because of the small samples in each leaf. This will make the LATE either incalculable or huge in the leaves resulting from some potential splits. But the causal forest implements the splits that maximize the variance of treatment e ects across leaves; if some treatment e ects are enormous because of smallsample variation in take-up rates, the key Athey and Imbens result -that an objective function maximizing treatment e ect variance is equivalent to minimizing the expected mean squared error of the unobservable prediction error -may not hold. We report how take-up rates vary across predicted ITTs to assess how much heterogeneity is from di erences in Our methodology for estimating causal forests, based on Athey and Imbens (2016) and
Wager and Athey (2018), is described in Davis and Heller (2017) . We give an intuitive explanation of the method here, attempting to avoid machine learning jargon to make the discussion accessible. Technical details are in Appendix H. The basic goal is to divide the sample into bins that share similar covariates and use the within-bin treatment e ect as the predicted treatment e ect for anyone with that bin's Xs. However, using the same observations to bin the data and predict the treatment e ects within bins could induce overfitting. So the procedure uses di erent subsamples for binning and for e ect estimation. It repeats the procedure over many subsamples and averages the predictions to reduce variance.
To predict ITT e ects conditional on covariates for a particular outcome, we repeat the following procedure: First, draw a 20 percent subsample without replacement from the data. Using a random half of the subsample, use a regression tree-based algorithm to bin the observations by values of X. 13 The algorithm recursively searches over possible ways to 12 The causal forest's flexibility in searching for benefiters while still avoiding over-fitting is desirable because our key research question is whether any subgroup benefits. Other regression tree-based approaches, including Bayesian Additive Regression Trees, share this flexibility and may have di erent stability and regularization properties. If the question of interest is instead whether (or which of) a small number of Xs predict heterogeneity, alternative approaches like LASSO could be more appropriate. 13 We use a subset of covariates that are available for nearly everyone in the sample includ-break the data into bins based on values of covariates, choosing the divisions that maximize the variance of treatment e ects across bins subject to a penalty for within-bin variance (see appendix for algorithm details). 14 Once the bins are formed, switch to the other half of the subsample and sort the new observations into the same bins. Calculate the treatment e ect (· b =ȳ T,b ≠ȳ C,b , or the di erence in mean outcomes between treatment and control observations) using the new observations within each bin b.
Next, switch to the other 80 percent of the sample (observations that are not part of the subsample), figure out in which bin each observation would belong based on its Xs, and assign that bin's· b as the predicted treatment e ect. 15 Predictions averaged across many trees have better predictive accuracy than estimates from a single tree given the high variance ing demographics (age in years and indicator variables for being male, Black, or Hispanic), neighborhood characteristics from the ACS (census tract unemployment rate, median income, proportion with at least a high school diploma, and proportion who rents their home), prior arrests (number of pre-randomization arrests for violent crime, property crime, drug crime, and other crime), prior schooling (indicator variables for having graduated from CPS prior to the program, being enrolled in CPS in the school year prior to the program, not being enrolled in the year prior to the program despite having a prior CPS record, and not being in the CPS data at all), and prior employment (indicator variables for having worked in the year prior to the quarter of randomization, for having not worked in the year prior to the quarter of randomization despite having a valid SSN, and for not having a valid SSN). 14 The variance penalty comes from Athey and Imbens (2016) . We also use inverse probability weights to deal with di erent treatment probabilities across randomization blocks. 15 This step is a slight deviation from Wager and Athey, who assign· b to the entire sample rather than the 80 percent excluded from the initial subsample. We find that this adjustment -using only out "out-of-bag" estimates -reduces over-fitting in our finite-sample setting, although it may require adjusted theoretical justification (Davis and Heller, 2017 subsamples (the causal parallel of a random forest rather than a single regression tree), averaging an observation's prediction across iterations to obtain a single predicted treatment e ect. We find that increasing the number of trees from 25,000 to 100,000 dramatically increases the stability of our estimates across di erent random seeds.
Participation
In To give a better sense of the counterfactual over the summer 16 for those with employment 16 UI data are quarterly, and the 2012 program started in the last week of June. So we define the "summer" program period as quarters 2 and 3 of 2012 (April -September) in the first study year and quarter 3 only (July -September) in the second study year, when the program started at the beginning of July. Given the similarity in results across cohorts for crime and other outcomes (see Appendix   Tables A5 and A6) , we focus the remainder of our discussion on results pooling the two cohorts, using two years of follow-up data to be comparable across study years. arrests decline by 26 percent (not shown, LATE = -3.5 per 100 youth, p = 0.067). We also see positive but not statistically significant point estimates for property-crime arrests in all years, and a marginally significant decline in drug arrests in year two. As a result, there are no significant changes in the number of total arrests (see Appendix Table A7 ). The decline in violent-crime arrests does not continue in the second year. Fade-out is almost universal in social interventions, though it is also worth noting that the program occurred at a high-violence moment in the youths' trajectories: The violence control complier means in year two are about half of the size of year one. This pattern suggests that part of the fade-out may stem from well-timed program delivery, after which youth start aging out of violent crime. It is also possible that more control compliers were incarcerated for their earlier violent crimes during the first year of the program, which could mechanically lead to lower crime rates among the control group during year two. However, the CCMs for drug-crime arrests are higher in year two than in year one, which is not entirely consistent with the idea that the control youth just have less time free to o end. Even if so, providing a SYEP is likely a less socially costly way to reduce crime than incarceration, and cumulatively across years, the violence drop remains significant (p =0.078).
Main Results
We see a marginally significant decline in drug crimes during year 2, and an imprecise but substantively large increase in property crime (which is statistically significant if we add the third year of outcome data for the 2012 cohort: 5.8 more property-crime arrests per 100 participants, a 46 percent increase, p = 0.053). Program e ects that go in opposite directions for violent and property crime are fairly common in the literature (e.g., Kling et al., 2005; Deming, 2011; Jacob and Lefgren, 2003) ; in fact, a short-term violence decline followed by a longer-term property crime increase is notably similar to the pattern of results in the Moving-to-Opportunity study. An increase in property crime might be expected if 20 00850 9
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youth are spending more time traveling or working, since they have more access to better things to steal (Clarke, 1995) . However, the changes in non-violent crime are less robust to multiple hypothesis testing adjustments, so we interpret them more cautiously. The fact that violence is so much more socially costly than other types of crime highlights the importance of analyzing crime types separately rather than aggregating the di erences away.
One possible explanation for the violence decline could be that participants learn about the returns to schooling, or develop motivation, self-e cacy, or other pro-social beliefs, and so spend more time engaged in school in the year after the program. The schooling results in Panel B, however, suggest this is not the case: We find no significant changes in CPS enrollment, days present, or GPA during the school year after the program, and the confidence interval in the pooled sample rules out more than a 4-5 day increase in attendance. 17 The conclusions are unchanged after adjusting inference for multiple hypothesis testing. These results focus on the year after the program, since missing data becomes a larger problem as youth age (more graduation and dropout in later years). To capture longer-term school engagement, the last row of Panel B shows the program's impact on whether a youth persists in school (remains enrolled or graduates) through the start of the third year after random assignment. The point estimate is small, negative, and statistically insignificant. Overall, there is little evidence of changes in schooling outcomes.
17 Section 3 above explains how we treat missing data in this table, with more details in Appendix C.2. Appendix I.3 shows that the results are generally robust to other treatments of missing data, including logical imputation that accounts for transfers out of the district; multiple imputation, which relaxes the MCAR assumption in this sample; and the inclusion of multiply imputed data for youth who were never in CPS records. 19 Some coe cients are greater than 1 in part because we are using a linear probability model; Appendix Table A10 shows estimated average marginal e ects using a probit, which are substantively very similar.
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Treatment Heterogeneity with the Causal Forest
We are interested in estimating treatment heterogeneity for three reasons. First, knowing who benefits most can help direct limited SYEP funding to those with the largest potential gains. 20 Second, it helps predict external validity. Knowing which characteristics are correlated with which responses to treatment could not only suggest other settings where similar programs should (or should not) be tested, but also assess whether observable di erences in youth populations across summer jobs and classical youth training programs help explain the di ering program e ects. Third, analyzing treatment heterogeneity across outcomes may help sort out the mechanisms driving the results. For example, it is possible that one subgroup benefits on employment, which drives a decrease in crime, while a di erent subgroup experiences less employment from crowd-out. But if crime benefits are not concentrated among the subgroup that benefits most from employment, then employment would seem unlikely to explain the overall violence decline.
As explained in Section 4 and Appendix H.3, we use a causal forest to predict an individual's expected treatment e ect for each outcome based on covariates. We estimate heterogeneity in the cumulative e ects of the program for the pooled sample, using the whether benefits are concentrated among subgroups in a way that helps explain mechanisms.
We start by testing whether the causal forest detects any treatment heterogeneity. Although the method will basically always predict some variation in program e ects in a finite sample (see Appendix H.4), we need to distinguish actual heterogeneity from noise. Figure 1 shows a visual presentation of how the "out-of-bag" predictions and actual treatment e ects are related. Along the x-axis, we bin observations into 20 groups by percentile of predicted treatment e ect. We calculate the actual ITT within each bin, then plot the actual versus predicted e ects for our three main cumulative outcomes. If the predictions were perfect, we would expect the points to line up on the 45-degree line. If they were just noise, we would see a flat relationship. The employment predictions appear to do quite well on average, with the fitted line close to the 45-degree line. For the other two outcomes, it does not appear that the observables consistently predict actual variation in treatment e ects.
There is no single statistical test for whether the variation in predictions represents meaningful treatment heterogeneity in the data (i.e., if the predictions "work"). If the true ÷ is 0, it would mean either that treatment e ects are homogenous or that any heterogeneity in e ects is not related to· . If the estimated ÷ is 0, it could also be because the predictions have too much noise relative to signal in our sample. So rejecting that ÷ = 0 means 1) there is treatment heterogeneity, 2) our Xs are associated with that heterogeneity, and 3) the predictions are capturing that heterogeneity (although if the coe cient is negative, the information in the predictions would be getting it backwards -one might prefer a one-sided test). If÷ is statistically indistinguishable from one, then with enough power, we would conclude that a one-unit change in the predictions is associated with a one-unit
The idea of testing the slope ÷ is intuitive, but it is also potentially unsatisfying for two reasons. First, predictions that do not provide a good linear fit across the whole distribution may still be of interest. For example, suppose only a small group benefits from the program, which is predictable based on observables, but observables do not predict heterogeneity among the remainder of the sample (i.e., the true interaction between treatment and prediction is highly non-linear (2019), show a related exercise using an above/below median split. The former uses a split-sample comparison with fewer trees, which produces results that are not entirely stable across di erent splits of the sample. Since the goal here is to learn from the predictions rather than assess the method, we use our full sample to increase stability, relying on the "adjusted honest" approach. We also increase the number of trees we use from 25,000 to 100,000. The predictions themselves are generally similar in both cases (correlations across the two di erent sets of predictions are over 0.99 for all three of our outcomes). But since we are using a quartile cuto to test for treatment heterogeneity, Monte Carlo error can generate small changes in predictions around the cuto , which in turn changes the composition of our ble with 100,000 trees. We may also worry that using other observations in generating an individual's predicted treatment e ect will induce correlation in errors.
We implement two other tests to ensure our conclusions are not sensitive to potentially problematic standard errors. We first report confidence intervals on the slope coe cient and quartile di erence tests from the split-sample procedure proposed in Chernozhukov et al. (2018) . This procedure generates an empirical distribution of each test statistic across many hold-out samples rather than relying entirely on asymptotic standard error results, while also incorporating the uncertainty generated by sample splitting (see Appendix I.5.3 for details).
For computational feasibility, we use 1,000 instead of 100,000 trees in each iteration, meaning the confidence intervals are likely conservative (they could get smaller with more iterations).
We then use a novel permutation test to ask a slightly di erent question: whether there is more information in the predictions than we would expect by chance if the Xs were actually independent of treatment e ects. To implement this test, we randomly permute an observation's set of baseline covariates across observations 1,000 times (enforcing the null that covariates are independent of treatment e ects by assigning each observation someone else's covariates), estimate a new causal forest within each permutation using 1,000 trees (for computational feasibility), and save the R 2 from a regression of each outcome on treatment interacted with the predicted e ect for that outcome in that permutation, treatment, the prediction, our usual set of controls, and block fixed e ects (the same regression underlying the slope test). Where the true R 2 falls in the distribution of permuted estimates provides a p-value for the hypothesis that the predictions are no more informative about how Y varies within the treatment group than they would be by chance if Xs were unrelated to · s.
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Table 4 shows the results of these tests for the same three cumulative outcomes as in Figure 1 . 24 Column 1 uses an indicator for any employment over the 6 post-program quarters as the dependent variable, where all the tests suggest that the causal forest picks up important heterogeneity in treatment e ects. In Panel A, the ÷ coe cient on the treatmentby-prediction interaction is 1.43 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 0.65 to 2.21.
The conservative split-sample approach yields a median point estimate of 3.75 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 1.21 to 6.29. Both rule out 0. The permutation test also rejects the null that the predictions are no more informative than they would be if the covariates were independent of treatment heterogeneity (p = 0.03). Additionally, Panel B shows that the group predicted to have the largest employment response has a significant 15 percentage point increase in employment, which is significantly di erent from the e ect in the rest of the sample (p-value of di erence = 0.02, split-sample 95% confidence interval [0.09,0.46]). In other words, the predictions successfully locate youth with large, positive treatment e ects.
We can conclude that there is treatment heterogeneity in employment impacts related to observables, and that the causal forest successfully predicts that heterogeneity. As shown in Appendix I.6 and discussed in the conclusion, a typical researcher-specified interaction approach that involved some data mining with adjustments for multiple testing would have missed this employment heterogeneity entirely.
For the other outcomes, however, we do not find significant treatment heterogeneity.
The estimated interaction ÷ for violent-crime arrests is -0.69. With traditional standard 24 We exclude pre-program graduates from the persistence column since the program could not change high school outcomes for this group. We report causal forest results for other outcomes in Appendix I.5.4; none successfully predicts heterogeneity.
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology errors, we cannot reject that the slope is zero, but we can reject that it is one (95 percent confidence interval [-2.22, 0.84] , although the split-sample approach is less precise). The permutation test also fails to reject the null (p=0.26). And the group predicted to have the largest decline in violent-crime has a similar point estimate as the rest of the sample, albeit with large standard errors on the test of the di erence. In other words, observables do not seem to predict treatment heterogeneity in violent-crime arrests -everyone in our sample benefits. Conversely for schooling persistence, it seems that no one benefits across all tests (MDE between quartiles=9.8 percentage points).
As with more standard interaction tests, the failure to predict treatment heterogeneity for two outcomes could be because treatment e ects are actually homogeneous, because heterogeneity is not related to observables, because the form of our tests obscures true variability in treatment e ects, or because we are underpowered. Heterogeneity analysis always requires a lot of data, and the standard errors on our tests are large enough to merit some caution. For violent-crime arrests, the minimum detectable di erence using traditional standard errors between the top quartile and rest of the sample is 17.2. If the violence decline were entirely concentrated among the top quartile, a -17.2 coe cient would be a 35 percent decline in violence among that group (which is not completely unreasonable since that is about how much overall violence declines in the sample). And when we use our full sample, we have the power to rule out a slope of 1 on the interaction test; we do not have enough data to do so with the split-sample approach. So we consider this suggestive, but not definitive, evidence of a lack of heterogeneity in violence impacts based on our Xs.
The school persistence results are noisier, with a standard slope confidence interval between 29 00850 9
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Nonetheless, we can conclude that the causal forest identifies a group who benefits from the treatment in terms of employment. Both individual interaction tests with adjustments for multiple testing and a split-sample approach that uses a fully interacted model to predict out-of-sample heterogeneity would miss the di erences in employment impacts (see Appendix I.6).
Having found variation in employment e ects, we use it in two ways: to describe who benefits and to explore mechanisms. Table 5 shows pre-program descriptive statistics broken down by quartile of predicted employment treatment e ects. The top row shows the mean
ITT predicted e ect in each quartile. The second row shows that the variation in ITT e ects is not simply driven by di erences in take-up rates. Although the participation rate increases a small amount across the quartiles of predicted employment e ects, it is not enough to explain the di erences in the ITT predictions (e.g., unadjusted for randomization block, the implied LATE for quartile 3 is 0.05 compared to 0.11 for quartile 4). The rest of the table suggests that the youth with the largest predicted employment benefits are more by contrast, the people whose employment outcomes improved in our sample -at least over the 6 post-program quarters in our data -tend to be younger and more engaged in school.
Second, targeting the biggest benefiters is not as simple as limiting program eligibility to the characteristics that are more common among big responders, such as still being a high school student or being Hispanic. High school students are more likely to benefit, but almost half of the youth in the lowest quartile of predicted employment responders are still in school. Our last task is to use the causal forest to assess mechanisms, in particular whether employment impacts could be driving the observed changes in criminal behavior. Figure 2 plots employment causal forest predictions on the x-axis (again binned into 20 groups by percentile of predicted treatment e ect on post-program formal employment, as in Figure 1) against actual ITT crime e ects on our four main crime outcomes within each bin. 25 Each crime outcome is the cumulative number of arrests in the two years after random assignment.
If better employment were driving the crime declines, we would expect negative slopes on these figures; crime declines would be concentrated among employment benefiters.
The left panel shows that the relationship between predicted employment e ects and actual violent crime e ects is an almost perfectly flat line. In contrast, the property, drug, and other crime slopes are all positive, meaning youth who benefit on employment are more likely to be arrested for these crimes. Appendix I.5 shows other tests consistent with the findings that youth with no changes in employment (quartiles 1-3 of the predictions) also experience a violence decline, and that other arrests go up among those who are working more. This pattern is not consistent with the idea that crime benefits are a result of the increased opportunity cost of crime from better employment. The results are more consistent with the idea that better employment generates more opportunities for theft and more income for drugs, while changes in violent crime are driven by mechanisms unrelated to employment.
All these tests, however, are quite imprecise. The 95% confidence interval on the violentcrime arrest slope implies that a one standard deviation increase in the predicted employment e ect is associated with somewhere between a -2.85 and 2.48 change in violent-crime arrests 25 Appendix I.5 explores the relationship between the employment predictions and other outcomes. 
Potential Gains from Program Targeting
We conclude with a back-of-the-envelope exercise to help quantify the gains of using the causal forest. Suppose policymakers were still interested in making 3,364 treatment o ers to fill 1,349 slots, but they wanted to target particular youth to maximize the impact on and J for details on this exercise and benefit-cost calculations).
Conclusion
This paper shows that a supported summer jobs program in Chicago generates large oneyear declines in violent-crime arrests, both in an initial study (42 percent decline) and in an expansion study with more disconnected youth (33 percent). The drop in violence continues after the program summer and remains substantively large after 2-3 years, though it stops accruing after the first year. And it occurs despite no detectable improvements in schooling, UI-covered employment, or other types of crime during the follow-up period. If anything, property crime increases in future years, though the large social cost of violence means that social benefits may still outweigh the program's administrative costs (see Appendix J).
Using a new supervised machine learning method called the causal forest, we show that the 0 average employment e ect masks a group whose formal sector employment improves by 15 percentage points (44 percent). We show that this subgroup is younger and more engaged in school than the group with no employment gains -fairly di erent from the out-of-school and out-of-work young people usually targeted by youth employment programs. However, the employment benefiters do not seem to drive the crime decline. Predicted employment impacts are almost completely uncorrelated with the impact on violent-crime arrests. And if anything, the impact on non-violent arrests is positively correlated with employment gains.
This is not consistent with the idea that changes in opportunity cost explain the crime e ects.
But it is consistent with other crime theory: Better employment provides more opportunity There tends to be a fair amount of pessimism in the youth employment literature about how di cult and costly it is to improve youth outcomes. The evidence we present here, combined with growing evidence from programs in other cities, suggests that this pessimism may stem in part from mistaken beliefs about what these programs achieve and for whom.
Rethinking what youth training programs do and how to target them, as well as further exploring why SYEPs decrease violence, may help better direct limited government resources and improve our understanding of youth behavior. 
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